The heirs of Genghis Khan – Mongolia on the international stage
In 1962, one-time US Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, said that “Great Britain had lost an empire and has not yet found a role.” Since 1990, it could be said that Mongolia has lost an ideology and is still seeking a path that is true to itself.
For much of the twentieth century, after re-establishing its independence from China in 1921 (the Mongolian elite’s loyalty was to the Manchu Emperor, not the succeeding Republic of China), Mongolia was under the tutelage of the USSR – treated more like a colony than the constituent parts of the Soviet Union ever were. Under Stalin, the Mongolian alphabet was changed to Cyrillic and a tremendous purge was launched against the ‘feudal’ Buddhist establishment (Karl Marx held that polytheistic religion was more backward than monotheism) – the population of Mongolia dropped by 7%. Nationalism and the history of the Great Mongol Empire were expressly forbidden.
Despite experiencing thorough ‘Sovietification’, Mongolia emerged from communism as a coherent sovereign entity with internationally recognised borders, unlike the identity crises suffered by all ex-Soviet republics (with the exception of the Baltic states). As with many post-communist countries, after being so long suppressed, nationalism has made a resurgence in Mongolia, particularly pride in the empire built by Genghis Khan (in Mongolian, Chinggis Khaan) and expanded upon by his descendants. With a population smaller than that of Wales, but with a land mass six and a half times the size of the UK, there is a certain fear of her two giant neighbours, Russia and China – especially the latter with its vast population – and this has produced prejudice to all foreigners from a particular section of society.
Mongolia’s position situated between two great powers is not unlike the mandala circle concept of first millennium India, where the ring of neighbours around it are natural enemies and the circle beyond contain potential allies. Though the democratically elected national politicians do not engage in overt xenophobia, they are mindful to develop links with other countries and blocs – the ‘Third Neighbour Policy’. In this regard, Mongolia has cultivated links with the USA, the EU, South Korea, Canada and Japan. Mongolia has implemented this ‘multi-pillared’ foreign policy using its rich mineral deposits to attract ‘third neighbour’ investment and adopting a free-market economy.
There have been cultural as well as economic exchanges, e.g. through its aid programme, the USA refurbished a communist-era monolith to serve as an American cultural centre with a fully stocked library of English-language volumes, serving as a nexus between ex-pats and Mongolians. In 2005, George W. Bush became the first serving American president to visit Mongolia.
There have also been some harder aspects to such relationships as well. After the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, Mongolia subsequently sent ‘peacekeepers’ to assist the coalition effort, 750 years after their country’s soldiers had first entered that region (sacking Baghdad and killing the caliph along the way). Although the American defence attaché to Mongolia denies it, there is talk among the ex-pats that the USA has built a secret military airbase not far from Ulaanbaatar, the capital city. That Dutch soldiers have trained in the Altai Mountains in the west (in preparation for Afghanistan) and British soldiers have conducted exercises in the wilderness of the Gobi (ahead of visiting Iraq), to name but two such missions, makes the existence of such a facility plausible.
China has not given up on absorbing Mongolia into its polity, shown in a low-key way by the visa-free access for all Mongolians crossing its borders and the government in Taiwan refuses to recognise Mongolian independence. It was confirmed to me, by a Russian, that Moscow would never tolerate Chinese annexation of Mongolia because it would set a precedent for Beijing to occupy swathes of Siberia where there is already a significant Chinese immigrant influx. While not eschewing cooperation with China (on whom Mongolia’s economy is heavily dependent) and Russia (where a resolution of Mongolia’s Soviet-era debt was achieved on terms favourable to Ulaanbaatar), Mongolia has made a decisive turn to the West. Mongolia acceded to the World Trade Organisation and became a Partner in the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe.
Still, there is an unachievable hankering for the glories of the distant past, evident in the replacement of the mausoleum of (socialist) national hero Damdin Sükhbaatar in front of the national parliament with three statues of the mightiest Mongol Khans, Chinggis Khaan, Ogedei Khaan and Kubilai Khaan, in seated repose. More expressive in display than the three Emperors of Germany inscribed on the Reichstag, a rosy view of the activities of these Mongol champions has taken hold – benevolent to Mongolian kin, their more ruthless, destructive aspects to other nations are downplayed, if not ignored altogether.
This is the challenge for Mongolian policy-makers in the years to come – to reconcile pride in the past with a pragmatic approach to its future dealings with important partners. There is this uncertain dichotomy but with the strong democratic institutions that Mongolia has built, with continued outside commitment, it is one, I am confident, can be overcome in time.
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